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Did the French Canadians Cause
the Conscription Crisis of 1 9 1 7 ?
DESMOND

MORTON

E d ito r’s Note: The text of this article is derived from a conference paper
given by Desmond Morton, Professor of History Em eritus of M cG ill at
the St-Jean-Quebec Company History symposium at the U niversite de
Montreal October 31, 2014.

the Great War broke out in 1914, Canada’s
acting High Commissioner in London, George Perley, MP
for the Quebec constituency of Argenteuil-Les Deux Montagnes
and temporary replacement for the late Lord Strathcona, received
a polite suggestion from the British colonial secretary: “W hy not
raise a Royal Montcalm Regiment in Canada? It might associate the
name of Montcalm and the Province of Quebec specifically with an
Empire War?” Perley dutifully transmitted the message to his prime
minister, Sir Robert Borden but adding no endorsement for the idea:
“personally doubt wisdom of doing anything to accentuate different
Races as all are Canadians.” Perley was as blissfully unaware as the
Prime Minister about how profoundly the Great War would tear
Canada’s founding nations apart and doom his own party to Liberal
dominance for the rest of the Twentieth Century. While Montcalm
was better remembered in Quebec as a loser rather than a proud link
to an embattled France, Perley and Borden would have been wise to
consider how best to engage Quebecois in a war proclaimed by Great
Britain without any consultation with Ottawa or any other dominion
or colony in a world-wide Empire.
O f course, when he sent on the message, Perley seemed to be
right. The news of war inspired a popular excitement that was
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reported to be even greater in Montreal and Quebec than in the raindrenched cities of the Canadian West. French-language newspapers
were almost as enthusiastic as the Anglophone press in supporting
the war. Henri Bourassa’s Le Devoir dutifully echoed its proprietor’s
opposition to fighting in a British war, but no one could be astonished
at a familiar Bourassa opinion. Bourassa himself narrowly escaped
internment by the Germans. He was visiting Alsace to see how the
French language was surviving German occupation of the former
French province, and he slipped across the frontier minutes before
it closed. In Ottawa, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, leader of the Opposition
and French Canada’s leading federal politician declared a truce in
partisan conflict and insisted that Canada must do all in her power
to support the British cause.
A few months earlier, a sad and significant development had
occurred within Quebec’s share of Canada’s volunteer militia. The
86th Regiment in Trois-Rivieres was quietly disbanded. Opposition
politicians had an obvious explanation. The regiment had been
commanded by a former mayor who had become Minister of
Highways in Quebec’s Liberal government. Colonel Sam Hughes, a
Borden loyalist as well as an outspoken Orangeman, had been chosen
as the Conservative Minister of Militia. Hughes was a blind believer
in his own genius. He had answered the demands from Canadian
militarists, including his elder brother, James L. Hughes, for universal
cadet training for Canadian schoolboys and girls by insisting the
militia summer camps were the ideal environment for teaching young
Canadians patriotism and respect for their betters.
The truth about the 86th Regiment was perhaps more alarming
than the claims of political meddling. The regiment vanished from the
Militia List because its junior officers had failed to qualify for their
rank by attending courses at the infantry school at St-Jean or even the
artillery school at the Citadelle in Quebec City. When a provisional
school was established at the new armouries in Trois-Rivieres, hardly
any of the 86th’s unqualified officers showed up, though the timetable
would have allowed most of them to remain at their respective day
jobs. That failure was the last straw for the Militia’s senior officers and,
on the eve of war, the regiment was disbanded.
Sam Hughes approved the decision but played no active part
beyond approving the provisional school in a final attempt to save
the unit. When war came on August, his fear that the British would,
in his vernacular, “burke it,” led him to order the Union Jack to
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be hauled down from the roof of Militia Headquarters, only to be
restored when the war was declared. His staff had prepared a detailed
mobilization plan that selected specific militia regiments across
Canada to recruit to full strength and assemble at Petawawa, the
country’s biggest training camp. Hughes had a better idea. He had
turned down a plan to open a similar camp outside Quebec City
when local landowners became too greedy to surrender their land
at a nominal price. With a war in Europe, Quebec City would be
the idea place to embark a Canadian contingent and the proposed
camp at Valcartier was revived. Colonel William Price of Quebec’s
most powerful business family, was charged with preparing the camp
and contractors building the Connaught rifle range outside Ottawa
packed up their tools and travelled to the new camp to provide it
with one of the biggest rifle ranges in the world.
Instead of arriving with regiments hurriedly recruited and
expanded in their home towns, telegrams summoned colonels and
whatever officers and men they could assemble to come to Valcartier
where Sam Hughes would organize them into a First Canadian
Contingent big enough to form a British-style infantry division. In
the end, some 31,000 men arrived from the rest of Canada, far more
than an infantry division in numbers and even more outsized in the
ratio of officers to other ranks. Instead of twelve infantry battalions,
Hughes would organize nineteen. The bulk of the men— close to
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seventy percent— were British-born, many of them recent immigrants
who had learned that Canada, with its harsh climate and its “No
English Need Apply” signs, was not an easy place to make a fortune.
O f the remaining 30 percent, there is some evidence that Canadianborn Francophones were disproportionally more numerous than
their English-speaking counterparts. Organizationally, that made no
impact on Hughes.
Since Confederation, every significant operation by the volunteer
militia had been structured to ensure significant French-Canadian
representation. In the Red River Expedition of 1870, the two
Canadian battalions had each represented a major province, Ontario
and Quebec. In 1885, two French- speaking battalions, one each from
Montreal and Quebec, had gone west. Even in the South African War,
Major Oscar Pelletier and a francophone company raised in Montreal
had been part of Colonel O tter’s 2nd “Special Service” Battalion.
Later, one of three artillery batteries was essentially francophone
and Lt. Col. Frangois-Louis Lessard had commanded one of two
regiments of Canadian Mounted Rifles.
Periodically, some of the British generals who commanded the
Canadian Militia between 1874 and 1904, raised the issue of language,
usually to the annoyance and resentment of their stubbornly unilingual
militia staff officers. A British Arm y that raised its soldiers in India
and Africa had no room for unilingualism in its traditions but generals
who dared to raise the issue, such as Major Generals Ivor Hutton and
E.T.H. Hutton, saw their Canadian careers foreshortened.
The tradition of Quebec francophone involvement meant nothing
to Sam Hughes. If he wished the Canadians to be commanded by one
of their own, Colonel Lessard was an obvious choice though it was
inconceivable that Hughes would choose a French Canadian Roman
Catholic for a job he badly wanted for himself. Instead, Hughes
promoted himself to major-general and made it clear to the British
that he was the ideal man to command the Canadians when they
formed a division. The British remembered him in South Africa,
where he wrote letters to the Cape Town newspapers expressing his
contempt for his British superiors; they sent him home to Canada in
1900. In September 1914, the War Office appointed a British officer,
Major-General Edmund Alderson, who had commanded Canadians
in the Boer War and would command them in France until his
campaign to replace the seriously defective Ross rifle gave its chief
advocate, Sam Hughes, an obvious excuse to get rid of him
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When Canada’s First Contingent embarked for England in early
October, 1914, a single company in the 14th Battalion from Montreal
was composed of Francophones. A 12th Battalion was formed from
the tiny contingents from rural Quebec and Atlantic Canada militia
units. When a Second Contingent was launched in October, it took
a delegation of Montreal businessmen, led by Arthur Mignault, a
wealthy patent medicine manufacturer, and a campaign by La Presse,
then Canada’s largest daily newspaper, to persuade Hughes that the
new contingent could include a 22e bataillon Canadien-frangais.
While Mignault and Lorenzo Prince, managing editor of La Presse,
suggested a number of possible commanding officers for the battalion,
Hughes imposed his own choice, an elderly Colonel Frederic Mondelet
Gaudet, whom the Minister himself had fired as the director of the
Dominion Arsenal for alleged incompetence.
Whatever his limitations, Colonel Gaudet had the good judgement
to find a successor in Colonel Thomas Tremblay, another, much
younger, product of the resolutely anglophone r m c at Kingston and a
man whose raw courage and commitment to discipline helped make
the 22e bataillon Canadien-frangais sufficiently outstanding to earn a
postwar place in Canada’s tiny permanent force. When Quebec M P ’s
discovered after the war that five of twenty-five Canadian soldiers
executed by firing squad bore French names, they planned an angry
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protest. When they discovered that Colonel Tremblay had approved
most of the executions to reinforce the discipline and self-respect of his
battalion, they dropped their plans, Tremblay had restored the military
prestige Colonel de Salaberry had left as a heritage of French Canada.
When he cancelled the mobilization plan Militia staff officers had
prepared for a Great War in Europe, Sam Hughes gave himself the
power to determine how Canadians would be recruited and who would
lead them in battle. Hughes’s concept of organizing Canadians for
the war in France was to select a suitable commanding officer for an
infantry battalion or artillery battery and let the chosen officer recruit
the thousand officers and soldiers for a battalion or a couple of hundred
for a battery. They would also need fund-raising resources to finance
the advertising for the recruiting effort and to meet the expenses of
recruiting officers as they searched for volunteers in rural districts and
remote communities. The 22e battalion, for example, was recruited
mainly in Montreal but significant contributions came from Quebec,
Sherbrooke and Hull as the present Gatineau was called at the time.
Recruiting in Quebec posed some inherent structural difficulties.
The province had not experienced the brief but intense militarism
shared by Ontario and other predominantly Anglophone provinces
which had often taken the form of cadet corps in public and private
schools. Quebec’s population was, on the whole, more agricultural
than that of Ontario and men who transferred their labour from
the farm to the army dropped farm productivity dramatically. Rural
districts of western Ontario also proved to be reluctant recruiting
territory. Urban populations, by contrast, included the povertystricken elements created by the economic depression that coincided
with the last years of the Laurier government and continued in the
Borden years. Such men might be coerced into enlisting by the
promise of three meals a day and an army overcoat but they were
not necessarily valued member of the c e f . Montreal was also a centre
for munition production. Workers, male and female, were recruited
by reminding them that making munitions was as vital to victory as
soldiering. It was both dangerous and better-paid.
War in 1914 tended to encourage English-speaking Canadians to
identify with their British ancestors and to respond enthusiastically
to the demands of Imperial patriotism. For obvious reasons, this
mood found little or no echo among francophone Quebeckers. On
the contrary, the evidence that Canada had been engaged in a vast
and difficult war without consultation or consent persuaded many
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Quebecois that they had no personal commitment to the war. While
some, notably Bourassa’s lieutenant, Olivar Asselin, felt a passionate
commitment to fight or die for France, more Quebeckers were urged
by the clergy to let France be punished for its controversial secular
reforms in the early years of the twentieth century. A flow of Catholic
clergy across the Atlantic to Quebec filled many of the province’s
pulpits to suggest that France’s war and the consequent costs were
part of divine retribution for seizing control of public education.
The Borden government struggled to contain both pro-imperial
zeal and reluctance by insisting that service in the Canadian
Contingent would be entirely voluntary. Several hundred wouldbe soldiers were sent home from Valcartier in 1914 at the behest
of wives who had not granted their husbands permission to enlist
or of mothers who complained that their sons were under-age for
military service. Both the Prime Minister and Colonel Sam Hughes
repeated their commitment to the voluntary principle in speeches
across Canada. Hughes also encouraged recruiting with the repeated
insistence that volunteers would enter battle serving beside neighbours
and old friends, in battalions that, for the most part, were locally
recruited. Some c e f units welcomed recruits from Scandinavian and
other ethnic communities that had developed in the period of mass
European immigration during the more prosperous of the Laurier
years. A few recruited actively in Aboriginal communities.
Voluntarism was not without its risks. Major-General Willoughby
Gwatkin, the British officer commanding the Canadian Militia in
1914 warned the government that it could probably not maintain
more than two infantry divisions in the field if all recruits had to be
volunteers. It was a warning that Sam Hughes ridiculed as typical
of the timidity and incompetence of British army officers. Instead,
Hughes insisted, Canada could easily raise twenty-four divisions of
volunteers and Sir Robert Borden announced to Canadians in his
1916 New Year’s Day message that Canada’s enlistment target had
been raised to half a million men.
French Canada was part of the target for this massive enrolment.
With substantial financial help from Dr. Arthur Mignault and a
promotional campaign in the pages of La Presse, the ranks of the
22nd Battalion had been filled with the aid of drafts from Western
Canada’s francophone communities and from Acadians who enlisted
at Amherst, NS— the unit’s last Canadian stop before heading to
England with the Second Contingent. Hughes promptly authorized
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a 4ie bataillon to be recruited in Quebec’s Military District No. 5,
covering the northern end of the province. The command was given
to a former second-in-command of the 22nd Battalion, and it was
not a success. The bulk of recruiting occurred in the harsh winter of
1916 and in Montreal’s shelters for homeless men. Montreal had no
appropriate barracks and existing militia regiments, most of them
anglophone, proved reluctant to share their armouries with the men
of the 41st. The unit’s second-in-command was dismissed when he
used regimental funds to buy himself an automobile. Sent to England
to organize a mess for the battalion’s officers, Lieutenant Coderre, the
assistant adjutant of the 41st, was arrested for murdering a sergeant
from a neighbouring unit who had come to the premises believing
them to be a brothel. Arrested by British police, Coderre would
probably have been hanged for his offence without the snowstorm of
letters from prominent citizens of Sherbrooke protesting that “le fou
Coderre” suffered from mental, not criminal, disabilities.
The 41st became a major source of replacements for the severe
losses the 22nd Battalion suffered at Courcelette and Regina Trench
during the Somme offensive of 1916, and Colonel Tremblay was forced
to ignore his haemorrhoids and rejoin his regiment to restore the
stern discipline a first-class unit required to maintain its reputation.
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In all, eight of the 262 infantry battalions raised for overseas
service in the Great War addressed themselves to enlisting
francophone recruits and letting them serve in their own language.
While the quality of their recruits allowed French Canada’s 22nd
battalion to maintain its heroic and sacrificial record to the end of the
war, some of the recruited battalions resembled the 41st Battalion in
their quality of leadership and efficiency and some were possibly worse.
The 206th Battalion, raised by Lieutenant Colonel Tancrede Pagneulo,
was broken up in Canada after Pagnuelo himself directed his men to
desert. He, himself, was arrested, charged for stealing his soldier’s pay
cheques and sentenced to six month in prison. Some battalions were
very much better managed, trained and prepared for service.
As usual, everything depended on the officers and on the
commanding officer who selected them and managed the unit’s fiscal
administration. As Jean-Pierre Gagnon records in his thorough and
extensive chapters on the recruiting of men for the 22e battalion,
younger officers who had served in the francophone company of the
14th Battalion were obvious choices to organize units back home in
Quebec but how could they, in their young lives and brief service,
have acquired the knowledge and experience to manage the training
and administration of a regiment of raw recruits?
Olivar Asselin raised the i63re Battalion, “les poils aux pattes,”
with the distinct mission of fighting for France. With a war veteran as
Colonel, he accepted the lesser role of second-in-command. When he
complained about sharing a barracks with a drunken and disorderly
battalion, Sam Hughes promptly ordered the 163rd to defend the
British island of Bermuda. When he accepted Black recruits, the
venerable British commander-in-chief on the island was enraged and
ordered that the 163rd never be allowed near the Front. Asselin went
to war as a lieutenant in the 22nd, too poorly paid to support his wife
and three children.
Whether well or badly commanded, units raised in Quebec faced
difficulties familiar to anyone who has tried to recruit soldiers in war
time. The medical certificates of fitness, issued by family physicians,
frequently ignored obvious disabilities. W hy should a doctor annoy
current and future patients by denying a young man a chance to serve
his country? Each battalion struggled to fill its ranks but when that
task was complete and orders arrived for the embarkation to England,
francophone units promptly experienced hundreds of desertions or
absences without leave. A major expense for each unit’s recruiting

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015

9

Canadian Military History, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 25
98

: Did French Canadians Cause the Conscription Crisis of 1 9 1 7 ?

fund was the cost of prosecuting deserters in Quebec courts. Many of
the deserters simply enlisted in another battalion to retain a soldier’s
free meals and his $1.10 day’s pay. Others slipped back across the
American border where some miscreants set up shop to sell advice on
how to fool the military authorities. In the mood of Quebec by 1917,
none of this seemed particularly reprehensible.
Yet Willoughby Gwatkin had been right. By the summer of 1916,
Canada maintained four infantry divisions and a three-regiment
cavalry brigade on the Western Front. Participation in the battles
on the Somme cost 23,000 casualties; capturing Vimy Ridge took
ten thousand dead, wounded and prisoners. By the summer of 1916,
volunteers stopped appearing at recruiting depots across Canada and
in Quebec. There were many reasons. The supply of adventure-seeking
patriots had dried up. The brutal realities of Trench warfare crushed
romantic illusions of glory. Fervent assertions of British identity faded
into questions about the competence of the Empire’s generals in the
face of recurrent failures and mounting casualties.
In the spring of 1917, Dominion prime ministers gathered in
London to meet the latest British premier, the former Minister
of Munitions and radical Liberal, David Lloyd George. Dominion
politicians would finally learn how the war was really going.
Some news was good and already known. The United States
had entered the war; the Canadians had taken Vimy Ridge. After
years of failure and defeat, that was a very welcome victory. But the
Americans had no modern army and would need two years to create
one. Meanwhile, the winter offensive by the French Army had ended in
mutinies and mass desertions. On the Eastern Front, Russian armies
had reeled backward from German attacks and mass desertions and
mutinies had spread through the Czar’s armies and navy.
At the front, Russian soldiers were starved of food and ammunition
because the Russian railway system had crunched to a stop. Since
Moscow was the only site for repair shops, every line into the city was
jammed by broken down locomotives and railway cars. A Canadian
named Joe Boyle would solve the problem by ignoring landlords and
levering the broken cars and engines off the rails and into adjacent
fields. That came later. In the spring of 1917, we were losing a terrible
war. Was this a moment for Sir Robert Borden to report that Canada
would have to cut its contribution to the war in half? His answer was
the Military Service Act of 1917 with its escape-clauses for farmers
and their sons and for conscientious objectors, to be forgotten in 1918
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when English Canada had re-elected him and a Union government of
Conservatives and non-Quebec Liberals.
Did Quebec cause the conscription crisis of 1917? Dare we blame
Sir Sam Hughes? W hat could he or his government have done to
persuade a Quebec that had reluctantly gone to war in 1914 to give
its heart and soul to share a commitment when the prewar policies
of the government had ignored French Canada? W hat would it take
to make Quebec feel part of the Dominion its leaders had created in
1867 and sustained at each ensuing crisis?
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